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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________                            
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
I.  Introduction 
 We have approached this case with the utmost 
seriousness.  We are humbled by the fact that over a twenty-
eight-year period of time, the case has progressed through 
courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the U.S. 
District Court without James Lambert having been granted 
relief.  We, nonetheless, must decide this case consistent with 
what we believe our obligation to be, while according the 
utmost respect to the standard of review that we are required 
to apply.  Having done so, we now vacate the judgment of the 
District Court dated July 24, 2007, and remand this matter to 
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the District Court, which is directed to conditionally grant the 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  If, within 120 days of the 
date of this Opinion and Order, the Commonwealth fails to 
retry Mr. Lambert, he shall be released.1     
 
II.  Procedural History 
 It is not an overstatement to say that the procedural 
history of this case is extensive in the extreme, as would be 
expected in a case that has spanned more than twenty-eight 
years.  We have carefully examined the numerous issues 
Lambert has raised over these many years and how the 
various courts have resolved those issues.  We, however, 
decide this case on one issue, an issue under Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and find it unnecessary to 
address the other issues raised to us or the issues raised to the 
courts that preceded us.  So, too, only a summary of the 
procedural history that does not pertain to the Brady issue 
will suffice.   
 
 James Lambert and Bruce Reese were arrested and 
charged with murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy, and 
possession of an instrument of crime based on what the 
Commonwealth had been told by one Bernard Jackson, who 
subsequently testified for the Commonwealth in exchange for 
an open guilty plea to third-degree murder, robbery, 
conspiracy, and several unrelated crimes.  On April 25, 1984, 
Lambert was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree 
murder as well as the other crimes with which he was 
charged, and was sentenced to death.  Reese was convicted of 
second-degree murder, and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment.   
 
                                                 
1   Given this disposition, our order of November 23, 2010, 
which vacated the sentence of death given our conclusion that 
the jury instructions violated Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 
(1988), is now moot and will be vacated, and the 
Commonwealth’s petition for panel rehearing and rehearing 
en banc as to that order will be denied as moot.     
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 Lambert moved for a new trial and to vacate the 
judgment, motions which were denied.  He appealed, and in a 
3-2 decision with two Justices not participating, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld his conviction and 
affirmed the sentence of death.  See Commonwealth v. 
Lambert, 603 A.2d 568 (Pa. 1992) (“Lambert I”).  Lambert 
next filed a pro se Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act 
(“PCRA”) petition, which was amended by counsel on 
January 30, 1997, and twice supplemented thereafter.  On 
January 29, 1998, the PCRA court denied the petition without 
a hearing.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded for 
the PCRA court to write an opinion, which it did on March 4, 
2000.  Lambert again appealed, and the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion signed by two Justices, 
with two Justices concurring in the opinion, one concurring in 
the result, and two dissenting.  See Commonwealth v. 
Lambert, 797 A.2d 232 (Pa. 2001) (“Lambert II”).  Lambert 
then filed a second PCRA petition raising, for the first time, a 
claim under Brady, based on recently discovered exculpatory 
evidence.  That petition was denied as well, and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court again affirmed.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848 (Pa. 2005) 
(“Lambert III”).   
 
 In 2002, Lambert filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania raising twenty-four claims of 
constitutional error, most of which were accompanied by 
related allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.2  The 
District Court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing and 
denied relief on all claims, but granted a certificate of 
appealability (“COA”) on one guilt-phase claim relating to 
the Commonwealth’s alleged discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges at jury selection in violation of Batson 
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and one sentencing-phase 
claim relating to whether there had been a violation of Mills 
 
2  Lambert’s habeas petition was stayed pending exhaustion 
of the claims raised in that petition in his subsequently filed 
third PCRA petition.   
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v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988).  See Lambert v. Beard, 
No. 02-9034, 2007 WL 2173390 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2007).   
 
 We then expanded the COA to include the following 
issues:  (1) whether the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence and misrepresentation of the bargain 
given to its key witness in exchange for his testimony 
violated Brady; (2) whether Lambert was denied his right to 
present a defense, call witnesses on his behalf, and confront 
the evidence against him when he was barred from 
introducing evidence that Jackson and Reese had a history of 
committing robberies together and without him; (3) whether 
Lambert was denied his right to due process and a fair trial 
when the trial court allowed a witness called by Reese to 
identify Lambert for the first time in court; (4) whether 
Lambert was denied his right to due process when the trial 
court refused to sever his trial from Reese’s trial; (5) whether 
the trial court misled the jury about the role of appellate 
review in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 
(1985); and (6) whether Lambert’s penalty-phase waiver of 
his right to present mitigating evidence was not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.   
 
III.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331, 2241, and 2254.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  We exercise plenary review 
over the decision of the District Court, as the Court did not 
hold an evidentiary hearing.  See Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 
223, 231 (3d Cir. 2009).   
 
 Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), where, as here, a habeas petitioner’s 
claims were adjudicated on the merits in state court, our 
review is limited to determining whether the state court 
decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable 
application of Supreme Court precedent or an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the state court.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).   
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IV.  Factual Background 
 At approximately 9:00 on the evening of September 
23, 1982, the robbery of Prince’s Lounge went bad, and two 
patrons were shot to death.   The Philadelphia Police 
Department commenced an investigation, but the perpetrators 
could not be identified, although two of the three barmaids 
working that night gave general descriptions of each of the 
two perpetrators.  Not long after the murders, however, an 
anonymous tip was received by the Department identifying 
Bernard Jackson and “Touche” (later identified as Reese, 
Jackson’s brother-in-law) as the men in the bar that night.  
Each barmaid was subsequently presented, for the first time, 
with a photo array that included Jackson’s photo.  Sarah Clark 
identified Jackson as the man who was standing at the top of 
the stairs in the bar and ordered her to place the money in a 
bag just before she heard two gunshots from the rear of the 
bar, the shots that killed the two patrons.  Marie Green was 85 
to 90 percent sure that the man at the top of the stairs was 
Jackson.  Janet Ryan, the third barmaid, was working at the 
rear of the bar and dropped down and ran to the ladies room 
when the shooter pointed a gun in her face.   
 
 Jackson, who by then was in custody on another 
charge, learned that he had been identified by at least one of 
the barmaids and told the police about the Prince’s Lounge 
robbery and that Reese and “another dude,” whose name he 
could not recall, had done it.  His story, at least initially, went 
as follows.  He and Reese met the “other dude” (whom he 
much later identified as Lambert) for the first time less than 
an hour before the three of them decided to rob a bar.  After 
casing, and rejecting, one bar, Jackson, who admitted to 
having previously committed at least thirteen armed robberies 
of bars, made the decision to rob the Prince’s Lounge after 
ascertaining that a female friend of his was not working that 
night.  Jackson claimed to have waited in the getaway car 
while Lambert and Reese entered the bar and went upstairs, 
each armed with a handgun provided by Reese – Lambert was 
carrying the .32 and Reese the .38, which, as it turned out, 
was the murder weapon.  Jackson claimed not to have known 
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what happened in the bar aside from what he was told by 
Reese and Lambert when they returned to the car and fled the 
scene with Jackson at the wheel.   
 
V.  Discussion 
 It is undisputed that without Jackson’s statements to 
the police, the Commonwealth could not have indicted 
Lambert on these charges.  See Giglio v. United States, 405 
U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (finding evidence impeaching witness’s 
credibility material, in part, because without the witness’s 
testimony, “there could have been no indictment”).  Jackson, 
however, came burdened with a wealth of impeachment 
material, not the least of which were four prior inconsistent 
statements to the police about who did what and who said 
what on the night in question, and his admitted goal of 
testifying to save himself from a death sentence – “no doubt 
about it,” he said.  (A2180).  Predictably, he was savaged at 
trial.  One wonders how the Commonwealth could have based 
this case of first-degree murder on a Bernard Jackson.   
 
 But we digress.   
A. 
 Jackson’s statements of October 14, 1982, October 22, 
1982, January 14, 1983, and February 6, 1983 were 
devastatingly inconsistent with each other and with his story 
at trial.  He initially decided to give the police only “some of 
the truth” and told the police that Reese had admitted to 
shooting two people (A2002); then he told the police that 
Reese said Lambert was the shooter and that Reese was 
ordering the barmaid to give him the money (A2007, 2013); 
then he told the police that although he had previously said 
that Lambert had done it, that wasn’t true – he was “feeding 
them a story” when he said that Lambert said he had shot two 
people and “that was a lie, too.”  (A2080, 2082, 2100.)  Now, 
at trial, he said, he was going to tell the truth.  It was Reese, 
not Lambert, who said that he shot two people, but that 
wasn’t true either because what Reese really said was that “I 
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think we killed a couple of guys in there,” not that he did.  
(A2253.)  Indeed, Jackson was finally forced to admit that 
three months after the first of his lengthy statements to the 
police, he was still giving them different versions of what had 
happened.  Still, breathtakingly, at the very end of his 
testimony, with his credibility hanging, at best, by a thread, 
and conceding that he was testifying to avoid a death 
sentence, Jackson somewhat proudly announced that although 
he had “switched what [Lambert and Reese] did 
interchangeably,” he always said that Lambert and Reese 
were the two men involved – they were “the only two people” 
he supplied to the police.  (A2266-67, 2276.)   
 
 But that was simply not so, and neither the defense nor 
the jury was told that it was not so.  In the Police Activity 
Sheet of October 25, 1982, which first came to light during 
the PCRA proceedings, Jackson named Lawrence Woodlock 
as a “co-defendant.”  (A3334.)  The Commonwealth 
conceded at oral argument before us that the Police Activity 
Sheet should have been disclosed to the defense prior to trial.  
Aside from the other arguments made as to why that Police 
Activity Sheet was significant, there can be no question that 
given Jackson’s consistent position – his only consistent 
position, by his own admission, not to mention the evidence 
at trial – that the only participants were Lambert and Reese in 
the bar and Jackson in the car, the naming of another 
participant could well have destroyed what little was left of 
his credibility.   
 
 The PCRA Court considered whether the 
Commonwealth’s failure to disclose Jackson’s statement that 
there was another participant – a “co-defendant” – was 
material such that, as the Supreme Court explained, “there is 
a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed 
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999).  
The PCRA Court denied Lambert’s Brady claim on the 
merits, explaining that “[v]iewed in light of the record as a 
whole, the [Police Activity Sheet of October 25, 1982] is not 
material.”  (A227).  It concluded that “Jackson was 
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comprehensively impeached by the defendant and co-
defendant Reese at trial,” and “[d]espite being impeached on 
prior inconsistencies and lies to police, the jury [sic] 
determined Jackson to be credible.”  (A228.)  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed, explaining that the 
Police Activity Sheet of October 25, 1982           
 
would not have materially furthered the 
impeachment of Jackson at trial as he was 
already extensively impeached by both 
appellant and Reese.  Indeed, each codefendant 
cross-examined Jackson on the following:  
every inconsistency in his four police 
statements; that he was testifying on behalf of 
the Commonwealth pursuant to a plea bargain; 
and that he had several open robbery charges 
still pending and his testimony was motivated 
by a desire to receive lenient sentences for those 
crimes.  Any additional impeachment of 
Jackson arising from a police notation would 
have been cumulative.  Accordingly, the 
Commonwealth did not violate Brady by not 
disclosing this police activity sheet as appellant 
has failed to show its materiality.   
 
Lambert III, 884 A.2d at 855-56.  The District Court did not 
mention the Police Activity Sheet of October 25, 1982 in its 
Opinion, instead treating it as just one among the host of 
other items the Commonwealth had not disclosed and 
concluding that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
disposition of Lambert’s Brady claim was a reasonable 
application of federal law.  See Lambert v. Beard, 2007 WL 
2173390, at *10.   
B. 
“[O]ur duty to search for constitutional error with 
painstaking care is never more exacting than it is in a capital 
case.”  Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 422 (1995) (alterations 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  Nevertheless, AEDPA 
created a “new, highly deferential standard for evaluating 
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state-court rulings.”  Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 
(1997).  That statute bars a federal court from granting habeas 
relief unless the state court’s adjudication on the merits 
“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  “[T]he cutoff date for determining 
‘clearly established Federal law’ for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) 
is the date of the relevant state-court decision.”  Greene v. 
Palakovich, 606 F.3d 85, 99 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
“A state-court decision that correctly identifies the 
governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of 
a particular prisoner’s case certainly would qualify as a 
decision involving an unreasonable application of clearly 
established Federal law.”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 
407-08 (2000) (internal quotation marks and alterations 
omitted).  While the term “unreasonable” is “no doubt 
difficult to define,” “the most important point is that an 
unreasonable application of federal law is different from an 
incorrect application of federal law.”  Id. at 410.  “Under § 
2254(d)(1)’s unreasonable application clause, then, a federal 
habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court 
concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-
court decision applied clearly established federal law 
erroneously or incorrectly.  Rather, that application must also 
be unreasonable.”  Id. at 411 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “The unreasonable application test is an objective 
one – a federal court may not grant habeas relief merely 
because it concludes that the state court applied federal law 
erroneously or incorrectly.”  Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 
100 (3d Cir. 2005).  As the Supreme Court has recently 
explained, “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks 
merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded 
jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s 
decision.’”  Harrington v. Richter, No. 09-587, slip op. at 11 
(U.S. Jan. 19, 2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 
U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).  We have with “painstaking care” 
reviewed this case with this explanation in mind and have 
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found constitutional error.  It is our duty to correct it.  See 
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 422.   
 
C. 
 In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that 
“the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to 
an accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”  
373 U.S at 87.  The Supreme Court has clarified that material 
information must be disclosed even absent a defense request, 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985), and that 
the Brady rule applies to impeachment evidence as well as 
directly exculpatory evidence, id. at 676. 
 
Information is material “only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  Id. at 682.  “A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  “[A] showing of 
materiality does not require demonstration by a 
preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence 
would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal . . 
. .”  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.  “The question is not whether the 
defendant would more likely than not have received a 
different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence 
he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a 
verdict worthy of confidence.”  Id.  
 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that the 
Police Activity Sheet of October 25, 1982 was immaterial 
because Jackson was so thoroughly impeached that, ipso 
facto, additional evidence could not have made a difference.  
To be sure, “impeachment evidence, if cumulative of similar 
impeachment evidence used at trial . . . is superfluous and 
therefore has little, if any, probative value.”  Conley v. United 
States, 415 F.3d 183, 189 (1st Cir. 2005) (emphasis in 
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original); see also United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 191 
(3d Cir. 2002) (finding no Brady violation where another 
witness testified to the same supposedly exculpatory 
information); Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 251 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (“When a witness’s credibility has already been 
substantially called into question in the same respects by 
other evidence, additional impeachment evidence will 
generally be immaterial and will not provide the basis for a 
Brady claim.” (emphasis added)).   
 
Yet it is patently unreasonable to presume – without 
explanation – that whenever a witness is impeached in one 
manner, any other impeachment becomes immaterial.  In a 
similar context, the Supreme Court has rejected such an 
argument.  In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), a 
prosecutor knowingly elicited false testimony that a 
cooperating government witness had not, in fact, been 
promised consideration in exchange for his testimony.  
Rejecting the government’s argument that the defense had 
numerous other ways in which to impeach the witness, the 
Court held that it “[did] not believe that the fact that the jury 
was apprised of other grounds for believing that the witness . . 
. may have had an interest in testifying against petitioner 
turned what was otherwise a tainted trial into a fair one.”  Id. 
at 270.   
 
The logic of Napue has been extended to the Brady 
context, both by the Supreme Court of the United States and 
by various federal courts of appeals.  In Banks v. Dretke, 540 
U.S. 668 (2004), the Supreme Court rejected the state’s 
argument that no Brady violation had occurred because the 
witness “was heavily impeached at trial” and thus that his 
status as a paid informant would have been “merely 
cumulative.” Id. at 702 (alterations omitted).  Finding that no 
other impeachment evidence was “directly relevant” to the 
witness’s status as an informant, the Court ruled that “one 
could not plausibly deny the existence of the requisite 
‘reasonable probability of a different result’ had the 
suppressed information been disclosed to the defense.”  Id. at 
702-03.  See also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 689 (“If the testimony 
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that might have been impeached is weak and also cumulative, 
corroborative, or tangential, the failure to disclose the 
impeachment evidence could conceivably be held harmless.  
But when the testimony is the start and finish of the 
prosecution’s case, and is weak nonetheless, quite a different 
conclusion must necessarily be drawn.”). 
 
We have also recognized that undisclosed Brady 
material that would have provided a different avenue of 
impeachment is material, even where the witness is otherwise 
impeached.  See Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 387 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (holding that although the defendant was able to 
impeach the prosecution in certain respects, the suppressed 
information was material under Brady because there was a 
“significant difference” between the suppressed material and 
the information to which the defense had access); United 
States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 969, 972 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(rejecting the district court finding “that the jury had an 
opportunity to evaluate the informant’s credibility from other 
damaging testimony” and concluding that “[w]hether or not 
the jury has had an opportunity to consider other 
impeachment evidence is not the correct standard for 
determining materiality of undisclosed information”).  But see 
Lisa Michelle Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 253 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (“‘Suppressed evidence is not material when it 
merely furnishes an additional basis on which to impeach a 
witness whose credibility has already been shown to be 
questionable.’” (further internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Amiel, 95 F.3d 135, 145 (2d Cir. 
1996))).3 
 
3 Unlike in Lisa Marie Lambert, the impeachment at issue 
here is not simply “an additional basis on which to impeach.”  
Rather, as the First Circuit has recognized, “[c]onfidence in 
the outcome is particularly doubtful when the withheld 
evidence impeaches a witness whose testimony is 
uncorroborated and essential to the conviction.”  Norton v. 
Spencer, 351 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Here, the withheld information provided a 
unique basis on which to impeach – specifically, a basis that 
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Other federal courts of appeals have echoed the 
conclusion that additional, non-cumulative impeachment 
material implicates Brady.  See United States v. Torres, 569 
F.3d 1277, 1284 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Merely because other 
impeachment evidence was presented does not mean that 
additional impeachment evidence is cumulative . . . .”); 
Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 580 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(“However, that the jury had other reasons to disbelieve 
McLaurin does not render the suppressed evidence of the deal 
immaterial.  Evidence that the prosecution promised 
immunity to induce McLaurin to testify as its star witness is a 
wholly different kind of impeachment evidence . . . .”); 
Reutter v. Solem, 888 F.2d 578, 581 (8th Cir. 1989) (“The 
state argues that because Trygstad was a convicted felon his 
credibility already was suspect and the additional information 
regarding his petition for commutation and pending hearing 
thereon would not have affected the jury’s judgment as to his 
truthfulness.  Logic of this kind has been dismissed by the 
Supreme Court.” (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 270)).   
 
 What is critical here is that the undisclosed statement 
by Jackson that there was another participant – a “co-
defendant,” to use his word – was not just one more piece of 
impeachment material to be placed in a “so what” category 
because Jackson had already been so thoroughly impeached.  
Rather, the undisclosed Police Activity Sheet would have 
opened an entirely new line of impeachment, and would have 
done far more than simply allow the defense to point out — 
as it did — that Jackson was inconsistent and often changed 
his story.   The way we know that the undisclosed statement 
would have opened a new line of impeachment is that by not 
disclosing it, the prosecution was able to rely on Jackson’s 
consistency in naming Reese and Lambert as the perpetrators, 
the only point on which he was consistent at trial.  The 
Supreme Court has instructed that we may take the 
Commonwealth at its word that this was important.  See 
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 444 (“The likely damage is best understood 
 
shredded Jackson’s credibility on the one point on which the 
jury could have inferred that he had any credibility.    
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by taking the word of the prosecutor, who contended during 
closing arguments that Smallwood and Williams were the 
State’s two best witnesses.”).  Here, the prosecution’s closing 
argument emphasized Jackson’s consistency in naming 
Lambert and Reese as the perpetrators.  (A3115.)  No more, 
in our view, need be said to make clear that finding that 
Lambert had not met the requirements of Brady was an 
unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme 
Court precedent.   
 
In closing, we cannot help but observe that the 
evidence is very strong that Reese, not Lambert, was the 
shooter, even assuming that Lambert (and not Jackson, as two 
of the barmaids testified) was in the Prince’s Lounge that 
night.  First, it is undisputed that the .38 was the murder 
weapon, that the .38 was Reese’s gun and carried by him that 
night, and that Lambert (if he was there) had only the .32.  
Second, all three barmaids described the shooter as no more 
than 5’7”.  Reese is 5’7”; Lambert is 6’ to 6’1”.  Third, the 
testimony of Janet Ryan, the barmaid who suddenly 
remembered Lambert as having put the gun in her face, 
identifying him on Reese’s case only “from the nose up” 
(although she told the police at the time of the murders that 
she “didn’t even get a look at the man”) after failing to 
identify him on the Commonwealth’s case because “nobody 
asked me,” was, in a word, bizarre.  (A2824, 2844, 2940-41).  
These examples are precisely the types of evidence which can 
undermine a court’s faith that the verdict in question is 
“worthy of confidence.”  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.  Finally, and 
for what it is worth (perhaps Jackson saw the havoc his 
testimony had wrought), we note the post-trial proffer of 
Jackson’s affidavit, in which he says that Reese was the 
shooter and that Ryan was a friend of Reese’s family and 
would never testify against Reese.  The affidavit was rejected 
by the trial court as untimely and not in proper form.   See 
Lambert I, 603 A.2d at 572. 
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VI.  Conclusion 
 The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and this 
matter is remanded.  The District Court is directed to 
conditionally grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
The Commonwealth shall retry Lambert within 120 days.  If 
it fails to do so, Lambert shall be released.   
 
